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INTRODUCTION
ONALD DWORKIN IS ONE OF THE MOST PROLIFIC AND INFLUENTIAL LEGAL
theorists in recent history. For more than thirty years, Dworkin has
taken rights, political and moral philosophy, constitutional law, statu-
tory interpretation, euthanasia, abortion, and a host of other topics "seriously."
During the span of his distinguished career, however, he has never paid much
attention to the problems of crime and punishment. More surprisingly, even
though literature on the theory and justification of punishment is copious, few
scholars have attempted to make sense of criminal law by examining it from a
dworkinian perspective.'
In light of the monumental importance that Dworkin's ideas have for politi-
cal and moral theory, I am perplexed by the lack of literature exploring the im-
plications of his theory of "law as integrity" on criminal law. As George Fletcher
rightly asserted several decades ago, "criminal law is a species of political and
moral philosophy."' If it is true, as I think it is, that criminal law is a species of
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University Law School, White Plains, New York (All transla-
tions, unless otherwise noted, were done by the author.)
I For one of the few well-reasoned attempts to flesh out the implications of adopting a dworki-
nian approach to criminal law, see Kyron Huigens, The jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1793 (2007).
2 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW xix (2000).
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the more general genus of politics and morality, then those who theorize about
crime and punishment have much to learn from Dworkin. Accordingly, in this
Essay, I describe how a dworkinian theory of criminal law may change our ap-
proach to the subject. I will do so in four Parts.
First, I will endeavor to show that ascertaining the proper purpose or justifi-
cation of state sanctioned punishment by engaging in a conceptual analysis of
the concept of punishing is ill advised. Even though there appears to be some
kind of logical link between punishment and retribution, this nexus is not strong
enough to render a non-retributive theory of the justification of punishment
incoherent.3 Thus, appealing to conventions or definitional maneuvers does not
help us determine the aim of criminal law. Ultimately, the question regarding
the justification of punishment is one of political, not analytical philosophy.
In Part II, I will distinguish between sociological and normative theories of
punishment. This distinction is crucial because the problem concerning the ap-
propriate justification of punishment is eminently normative by nature. Justify-
ing the practice of blaming and punishing requires us to appeal to principles of a
higher order that fit our past practice while presenting it in its best light. A
merely descriptive account of why we punish will not do. A theory of the justifi-
cation of punishment must also explain why the defended theory is preferable to
alternate accounts also fitting the practice.
Such is the theory that I will advance in Part III. I will defend this theory's
appeal by showing how it fits with two basic principles of political philosophy
that, as Dworkin correctly pointed out in his latest book, most members of our
society share: the principle of self-determination and the principle of equality.4
This is what I call the "dworkinian theory of punishment."
Finally, in Part IV, I discuss the far-reaching implications that would follow
from embracing such a theory of the justification of punishment. Taken serious-
ly, this account of our institutions of blaming and punishing would cast doubt
over some features of our current corpus of substantive criminal law, such as the
legitimacy of punishing offenders for committing victimless crimes and the li-
mited exculpatory role of the consent defense.
1. PUNISHMENT AS AN IMPRECISE CRITERIAL CONCEPT
Punishment is an inherently hazy concept. There are no precise rules that
we can appeal to in order to non-arbitrarily settle disputes when considering
3 With regards to the conceptual link between punishment and retribution, see Luis Ernesto
Chiesa Aponte, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing, io NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 102 (2007).
4 RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 9-11
(zoo6). Dworkin speaks of the principle of "personal responsibility" and of the principle of "intrinsic
value." I prefer to refer to the principle of personal responsibility as the principle of "self-
determination" and to the principle of "intrinsic value" as the principle of "equality."
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whether a particular act should be counted as an instance of punishment. Take,
for example, the case of a mother who grounds her daughter because she disres-
pected her father. Is the daughter being "punished"?
In a recent work, Leo Zaibert suggested that if the mother did not believe
that the suffering she inflicts somehow "offsets" the wrong committed by her
daughter, this example should not count as a case of punishment., If the mother
did not believe that grounding her child in some way "negates" the harm in-
flicted by her daughter, Zaibert argues, she would only be disciplining her in-
stead of punishing her. This distinction strikes me as artificial. Reasonable
people could conclude the mother is punishing her daughter even if she does not
think her act "offsets" anything.
In fact, many consequentialist criminal law theorists believe the idea that
punishment can correct the harm wreaked by the commission of an offense is
nothing more than pure fiction. Take as an example the position espoused by
Claus Roxin, a leading German criminal law theorist. For him, asserting that the
act of punishing negates the injury caused by the perpetrator amounts to a me-
taphysical abstraction.6 Could it be that Roxin failed to grasp the essence of the
concept of punishment? I think not. To me, stating that a correct understanding
of punishment presupposes that punishing offsets wrongdoing is as mistaken as
claiming that a proper comprehension of the concept of marriage necessarily
involves the wedding of a man and a woman.
The reason for this is that punishment, like marriage, is an inherently impre-
cise criterial concept. Criterial concepts are imprecise when, in light of their very
nature, it is impossible for us to agree on the necessary and sufficient conditions
that set forth the criteria for the correct application and use of the term or
phrase. 7 We know, for example, that marriage involves some sort of union be-
tween two people. However, we could reasonably argue about whether a union
between same sex couples counts as a marriage or whether true marriage is for-
ever or whether it does not make sense to talk about marriage if the man or
woman to be wed are unable to conceive.
In the same way, we know that punishment involves the infliction of some
kind of pain or suffering. We can reasonably debate, however, whether we can
intentionally punish the innocent or whether a non-purposeful infliction of pain
should qualify as an instance of punishment or whether, as H.L.A. Hart appeared
to suggest, only actions "administered by human beings other than the offender"
count as punishment.'
5 LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 33 (2006).
6 CLAUS ROXIN, DERECHO PENAL 84 (Luz6n Pefia, et al. trans., 1997).
7 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 9 (20o6).
8 H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5 (1968). If
Hart's accounts of punishment were true, it would follow that self-punishment is not really an in-
stance of punishment after all. This is debatable. Recently, Leo Zaibert advanced powerful arguments
Nrim. 1 (2007)
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In light of the fact that punishment is an imprecise criterial concept, appeal-
ing to definitional maneuvers in order to determine what is the proper purpose
of punishment is injudicious. To do so would be tantamount to resolving a com-
plex normative issue, the question about the justification of punishment, by
merely defining a concept. In my opinion, this would be a mistake because the
normative question regarding the justification of punishment can only be re-
solved by engaging in an examination of moral and political considerations. In
spite of this, some scholars have tried to develop a theory about the justification
of punishment by appealing to a logical analysis of the concept.
This is not to say, however, that one should avoid the definitional task alto-
gether. As I have attempted to demonstrate, it is possible to highlight some fea-
tures that must exist in order for something to qualify as a "marriage" or as an
act of "punishment." Claiming that marriage does not necessarily involve the
wedding of two people is a conceptual mistake in much the same manner as it
would be mistaken to claim that someone who is married is a bachelor. Similar-
ly, it would be a conceptual mistake to assert that punishment inevitably does
not involve attempting to make the person punished suffer or experience some-
thing unpleasant.
Clearly, there is some value in trying to elucidate the elements that, by defi-
nition, are logically related to a given concept. In the context of punishment, an
examination of the elements logically linked to the concept helps us rule out the
possibility that a certain act might count as punishment. Imagine, for example,
that Pat gave John one hundred dollars for slapping Howie's face. Obviously,
Pat's act cannot count as an instance of punishment. The reason for this is con-
ceptual in nature. Since punishment logically entails attempting to inflict pain, it
would be incoherent to claim that someone who makes the supposed offender
experience pleasant consequences is imposing punishment. Consequently, it
would be a conceptual error to assert that Pat punished John.9
It would be a mistake, however, to overstate the importance of definitional
endeavors such as this one. Imprecise criterial concepts should not be confused
with natural-kind or ontological concepts such as animals or substances. It is
certainly possible to determine whether an odorless and colorless substance is
liquid nitrogen or water by appealing to conventionally accepted criteria. Ex-
amining the liquid's chemical composition would suffice. Since "liquid nitrogen"
and "water" are natural-kind concepts, it makes sense to claim to have discov-
ered their true essence. ° Contrarily, since imprecise criterial concepts such as
marriage or punishment cannot be defined categorically by appealing to uncon-
in favor of the proposition that self-punishment is in fact a type of punishment. See ZAIBERT, supra
note 5.
9 In a recent article, I suggested that an analysis of the concept of punishment reveals that an act
counts as an instance of punishment only when it is carried out in response to the perceived or actual
commission of a wrongful act. See Chiesa Aponte, supra note 3.
10 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 1o.
120 VOL. 76
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troversial agreed-upon criteria, trying to establish the true essence of these con-
cepts is futile. Hence, there is no objective way of determining whether a par-
ticular definition of punishment is superior to others." This is why, contrary to
what some scholars suggest, clarifying the definition of punishment does not
shed much light on the problem regarding the justification of punishment.'
II. SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT VS. NORMATIVE
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
True theories regarding the justification of punishment are normative, not
sociological. Sociological theories primarily aim at explaining the practice of
punishing. On the other hand, normative theories mainly seek to elucidate what
the purposes of criminal law should be and not at providing a descriptive account
of our institutions of punishment. Duff s "communicative" theory of punishment
constitutes a chief example, for when he states that the aim of punishment is
primarily to establish a moral dialogue between the offender and the communi-
ty, he is attempting to justify our practices of blaming and punishment, not ex-
plain them.3
Problems arise when theorists confuse the descriptive and normative fea-
tures of their theories of punishment. Feinberg's expressivist account of punish-
ment constitutes one such example.'4 When Feinberg states that the essence of
the criminal sanction is that it communicates condemnation, he seems to be
making a descriptive claim about how punishment functions in our society. In
other passages, however, Feinberg appears to suggest that his theory intends to
justify punishment, not merely describe it. This is an infelicitous proposition, for,
as Professor Zaibert has lucidly argued, it "conflat[es] the problem of the defini-
tion of punishment with the problem of its justification."5
The conceptual confusion generated by the expressivist conflation can be il-
lustrated by the positions defended by Dan Kahan in his oft-cited article about
in Of course, stipulating a more refined or precise definition of punishment might prove to be
useful within a certain context. No one can deny, for example, that defining punishment in a precise
way is extremely important for determining the scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
.cruel and unusual punishments." Establishing a definition of punishment is useful in this context
because it promotes consistency in the application of the law and makes it easier for lower courts to
determine whether a particular act violates the Eighth Amendment. It would be a mistake, however,
to believe that this more refined definition comes closer to capturing the true essence of the concept
of punishment than other definitions. While such a definition might be more convenient than others
in this context might, it is by no means more "true" or "accurate" than alternate definitions.
12 ZAIBERT, supra note 5.
13 R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (M. Tonry, ed., 1998).
i4 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Nature of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95-118 (1970).
15 ZAIBERT, supra note 5, at u6.
WNfi. 1 (2007)
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the meaning of alternative sanctions.6 Kahan's argument can be summarized as
follows: (1) by definition, punishment is meant to express moral condemnation;
(2) some alternative sanctions, such as shaming penalties, unambiguously ex-
press moral condemnation, while other alternative sanctions, such as communi-
ty service or fines, do not unambiguously express such condemnation; (3) there-
fore, shaming penalties are a politically acceptable alternative to imprisonment
while other alternative sanctions, such as community service or fines, are not.
Once one understands that theories of punishment can be sociological or
normative, it is easy to realize that Kahan's conclusion is either trivially true or
false. If Kahan is merely making the descriptive claim that shaming penalties
express moral condemnation more unambiguously than fines or community
service, his conclusion is trivially and uncontroversially true. No one would dis-
agree with the proposition that, in our society, shaming penalties express more
condemnation than most other alternative sanctions.
Of course, the aforementioned sociological claim in no way helps us deter-
mine whether the State can justifiably inflict shaming sanctions. Even if, for the
sake of argument, we accept that punishment inevitably expresses moral con-
demnation and that shaming penalties express condemnation more unambi-
guously than other alternative sanctions, it does not follow that inflicting sham-
ing sanctions is justified morally or politically. The reason for this is that one
cannot justify a normative conclusion solely by appealing to a descriptive claim.
This can be illustrated by using as an example the case of Plessy v. Fergu-
son.'7 Even if we could prove that, at the time the Supreme Court decided the
case, desegregation would have been, from a sociological point of view, a "politi-
cally unacceptable" option for the community, it does not follow that segrega-
tion is justified or that it constitutes an "acceptable solution" to the problem of
racism. This move from a descriptive to a normative claim is incoherent.
This explains why Kahan cannot justify the infliction of shaming sanctions
by pointing out that they are one of the few types of alternative penalties that
adequately and unambiguously express moral condemnation. As I attempted to
show at the beginning of this Part, expressive theories of punishment such as
Feinberg's or Kahan's are partially or entirely descriptive in nature. They tend to
describe our practices of punishing, not justify them. This is why stating that
shaming penalties express condemnation does not justify their use in much the
same manner as asserting that punishment is expressive does not justify its in-
fliction.
The stage is now set for me to put forth what I call my "dworkinian theory of
punishment." It is important to bear in mind that this dworkinian theory of pu-
nishment is normative in nature. Therefore, the theory's main objective is to
legitimize our institutions of punishment, not to explain them. In addition, the
i6 Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 653 (1996).
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that segregation laws did not violate equal protection).
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theory that I will espouse is not about the definition of punishment. I am uncon-
cerned about definitional quibbles regarding whether a particular act counts as
punishment. I assume that punishment, like marriage, is an imprecise criterial
concept whose conventional meaning, even though inherently hazy at the edges,
is clear enough for us to have consequential discussions about the subject.
III. A VICTIM-ORIENTED THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
A. Vindicating Norms or vindicating Victims?
Should we punish people because they disobeyed the rules or should we pu-
nish them because they caused harm? The answer to this question depends on
whether we think that the principal purpose of criminal law is to ensure alle-
giance to governmental institutions or whether its aim is to protect and assert
victim's rights. It makes sense to punish people for mere disobedience if we be-
lieve that the primary aim of our system of criminal justice is to guarantee con-
formity with the law. Instead, if we believe, as I do, that the most important ob-
jective of criminal law is to safeguard the rights of persons,18 it would make sense
to punish people only when they harm others by unjustifiably interfering with
their rights.'9
Stating that people should be punished merely because they disobeyed the
rules is not normatively appealing because norms can be utterly unjust and arbi-
trary. During the Nazi regime, for example, there was a rule prohibiting a non-
Aryan from engaging in sexual intercourse with a member of the Aryan race.
Violators of this norm were subjected to severe penalties. 0 Most would agree
those who engaged in the act criminalized by the aforementioned rule should
not have been punished, because no sound reasons exist for prohibiting such
conduct. This position, however, is difficult to support if one defends the propo-
sition that people should be punished merely for disobeying norms.
In fact, it might be claimed that those who do not interfere with the rights of
others are sometimes punished merely for disobeying rules. Drug offenses con-
stitute prime examples. Usually, the person who possesses a small quantity of
marijuana for personal use is not committing an act that violates the rights of
others. Thus, the person who engages in this conduct is not punished for causing
harm to a victim. He is penalized solely because he failed to obey the rules. This
s8 Note that, as I have stated elsewhere, the term "person" is not equivalent to "human being." As
the case of corporations demonstrates, an entity can be considered a "person" even if it is not a
member of the Homo sapiens species. Thus, I believe the legal term "person" should be read broadly
to encompass non-human beings such as animals and corporations. For a more detailed discussion of
these issues, see Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Of Persons and the Criminal Law: (Second Tier) Person-
hood as a Prerequisite for Victimhood, 29 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 2oo8).
19 MARKUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 152
(2002).
20 FRANCISCO MUFlOZ CONDE, EDMUND MEZGER Y EL DERECHO PENAL DE SU TIEMPO (2003).
N~im. 1 (2007)
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example proves that, from a sociological point of view, people occasionally are
punished only because they disobeyed the law. It would be a mistake, however,
to conclude from this sociological observation that punishing disobedience of
the law is normatively justified. In the same way that one cannot justify punish-
ing a non-Aryan for engaging in sexual intercourse with an Aryan simply by
pointing out that there was a rule prohibiting the conduct, one cannot justify the
infliction of punishment merely by pointing out that the defendant violated a
norm. In order to justify someone's punishment, the State needs to demonstrate
that a rule was infringed and that sufficient sound reasons exist for criminalizing
the conduct prohibited by the rule." Mere demonstration of the fact that the
alleged offender disobeyed the norm is not enough.
In the past, many argued that people deserved punishment when their con-
duct showed contempt for the king or for the government. This was consistent
with an authoritarian and paternalistic conception of the State. As time passed
and societies became more democratic and governments less authoritarian, this
theory of the justification of punishment has proved unsatisfying. The focus of
criminal law has now shifted from safeguarding the State to the protection of
persons. In our society, "crimes do not disturb the king's peace and thereby of-
fend him; they interfere with the rights of persons." 3 Hence, "the essence of
crime is not the violation of one's duty of loyalty and obedience to the sovereign
but the violation of one person's [interests]." 4 This is why, in our political com-
munity, our institutions of punishment are better understood as a vehicle for
vindicating the rights of the victim and not as a mechanism for vindicating
norms that have been violated.
B. Justifying Violence
Anyone positing a theory about the justification of state-inflicted punish-
ment must necessarily engage in fundamental questions of political philosophy.
What is the purpose of the State? What is the relationship between government
and its citizens? Which rights have citizens reserved for themselves and which
rights have they ceded to the State? Why and when can government justifiably
use violence to interfere with the rights of its citizens?
As an eminent Spanish criminal law scholar has observed, "to talk about the
criminal law is always, in one way or another, to talk about violence.... violent
are the cases that generally concern criminal law (robbery, murder, rape, rebel-
lion), [and] violent is the way in which criminal law responds to these cases
z See Chiesa Aponte, supra note 3.
z DUBBER, supra note 19, at 151-52.
23 Id. at 152.
z4 Id.
VOL. 76
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(prison, mental institutions, suspension and deprivation of rights)." 5 If punish-
ment and criminal law represent a type of state-sanctioned aggression against
individuals, then a theory justifying our institutions of punishment is essentially
a theory about legitimatizing the State's so-called monopoly over violence.
In order to justify the State's use of violence, we need to demonstrate how
this form of governmental interference with fundamental rights can fit together
with the basic principles shared by most members of our political community.
According to Dworkin, citizens in most democratic communities share a com-
mitment to two fundamental principles. The first of these principles is the prin-
ciple of self-determination, which holds that "each person has a special respon-
sibility for realizing the success of his own life, a responsibility that includes ex-
ercising his judgment about what kind of life would be successful for him."6 This
entails we should "not subordinate ourselves to the will of other human beings"
and that we have no reason to "accept the right of anyone else to force us [to
make fundamental decisions in our lives] that but for that coercion we would
not choose."2 7 The second of these principles, the principle of equality, entails
"the recognition of the equal objective importance of all human lives."' 8 Respect
for this principle compels us not to "act in a way that denies the intrinsic impor-
tance of any human life."29
I believe that the legitimacy of our political institutions hinges primarily on
whether they can be shown to vindicate these two fundamental principles. Our
state-sponsored practices of punishment are no exception. In the remainder of
this Part, I will attempt to show how governmental infliction of punishment can
be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the vindication of said principles.
C. Punishment as a Way of reasserting the Fundamental Importance of the
Principle of Self-Determination and the Principle of Equality
At its core, a crime is an act in which two persons, victim and offender, inte-
ract. Because of this interaction, the perpetrator advances his interests at the
expense of the victim's rights. In the case of rape, for example, the offender seeks
pleasure by violating the victim's fundamental right to decide how and when she
wants to engage in sexual intercourse. By engaging in non-consensual sexual
intercourse, the offender is forcing the victim to participate in an intimate act
that, but for that coercion, would not have occurred. This constitutes a violation
of the principle of self-determination. It also constitutes an infringement of the
principle of equality because with his act the perpetrator demonstrates that the
25 FRANcIscO MUoF0Z CONDE, DERECHO PENAL Y CONTROL SOCIAL14 (1985).
26 DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 9.
27 Id. at 17.
28 Id. at16.
29 Id.
NWim. 1 (2007)
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life and wishes of the victim are of less importance to him than his private inter-
ests are.
Citizens in a liberal political community expect that their government will
protect them from acts that impinge on their autonomy in an unwarranted
manner. As a result, when someone commits a criminal act that infringes the
basic principles of self-determination and equality, the expectations that citizens
have about their State as protector of their rights-shielding them from unjusti-
fied attacks that interfere with those rights-is frustrated. Punishment
represents the reaction to this frustrated expectation. By punishing the perpetra-
tor, the State reasserts the fundamental importance of the principles of self-
determination and equality and, thus, reinforces the expectation that law-
abiding citizens have: that government will do its best to protect their basic
rights. When viewed in this manner, punishment represents the way in which
government vindicates individual rights by expressing solidarity with the victim
and rejecting the offender's harmful act.30
IV. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE TAKE VICTIMS SERIOUSLY?
The theory of punishment sketched in the last Part has, at the very least, two
important implications. First, it casts doubt over the legitimacy of punishing
people for the commission of so-called victimless crimes. Second, it suggests that
the victim's consent should be a defense to every crime, including murder.
If the chief purpose of punishment is to reassert the fundamental impor-
tance of the principles of self-determination and equality, the legitimacy of pu-
nishing someone for committing a victimless crime would not be unclear. These
principles are violated when a person denies the intrinsic importance of the val-
ue of another person's life by unjustifiably interfering with his autonomy. In the
context of criminal law, the person who infringes these principles is the offender
and the person whose rights are violated by the offender's action is the victim.
Hence, if there is no victim, there is no infringement of the principles of self-
determination and equality that needs to be remedied by punishing the offender.
Most drug-possession offenses represent paradigmatic cases of the type of
victimless crimes whose commission does not justify the infliction of punish-
ment. Take the act of possessing marijuana for personal consumption as an ex-
ample. This conduct does not interfere with another person's autonomy. The
person who commits this offense has not denied the value of someone else's life,
nor has he interfered with the rights of others. There is no victim whose right to
self-determination or equality needs to be vindicated by punishing the offender.
While it cannot be denied that, in these cases, the perpetrator has violated a
norm, punishment cannot be justified merely by showing that a rule was dis-
30 The relationship between punishing and expressing solidarity with the victim has been dis-
cussed in detail by George Fletcher. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BAsIc CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW
(1998).
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obeyed. Thus, as a rule, punishment should be inflicted only when the violation
of the norm caused harm to a victim.3' Nonetheless, since the person who pos-
sesses marijuana for personal consumption has harmed no one, the legitimacy of
punishing him for such an infraction is doubtful.
A victim-oriented theory of punishment also has implications for the doc-
trine of consent. The principle of self-determination is violated only when some-
one forces us to do something that we do not wish to do. Hence, there is no vi-
olation of the aforementioned principle when the person consents to the act that
the other person wanted him to perform. The consent of the victim changes
what initially appears as an unjustifiable act of forceful subjugation into a per-
missible act of self-determination? As Professor Dubber aptly points out:
By consenting, the apparent victim rebuts the presumption of victimhood.
He indicates that another's act that facially satisfies the elements of a crime does
no harm to his autonomy in fact. In light of the consent, an apparent act of hete-
ronomy is revealed as an act of autonomy. 33
The alleged victim who consents to the act is making a conscious decision
about the types of acts that make his life worthwhile. Therefore, the consenting
victim is not suffering any interference with his rights that need to be vindicated
by the infliction of punishment? 4
Upon closer inspection, it turns out that punishing someone for performing
an act to which the alleged victim consented is tantamount to punishing some-
one for committing a victimless crime. The reason for this is that, if the victim
consents to the act, he is not really a victim at all. Consequently, punishing the
supposed offender for engaging in the consented act is as objectionable as in-
flicting punishment on a person who committed an act that did not cause harm
to a victim. In this regard, interpreting the doctrine of consent along these lines
has sweeping consequences. For example, one dramatic implication of the vic-
31 I should stress accepting my claim that the chief purpose of our criminal justice system should
be to vindicate victims does not entail it is illegitimate to criminalize conduct that does not cause
harm to a person. As I have stated elsewhere:
[P]rohibiting conduct that does not cause harm to a victim is [not] necessarily illegitimate.
No one seriously believes, for example, that criminalizing the act of driving while intox-
icated is injudicious or unjustifiable. Although such conduct does not entail an interfe-
rence with the interests of others, the undeniable dangerousness of the act seems to pro-
vide a more than adequate reason for its prohibition. Nevertheless, in the absence of com-
pelling reasons that point to the contrary, victimless crimes are generally considered to be
at least prima facie or presumptively illegitimate.
Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish-Harm, Victimhood and the
Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 MISS. L.J. (forthcoming 2oo8), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/so13 /papers.cfm?abstract-id=no449 4 .
32 DUBBER, supra note 19, at 264.
33 Id.
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tim-centered view of consent elaborated here is that punishing someone for as-
sisting another person to commit suicide would be difficult to justify. The person
who consents to being assisted in suicide is consciously making the important
decision that his life is one not worth living anymore. Someone who assists this
person in committing suicide is helping him exercise his right to self-
determination. Thus, punishing the supposed offender in cases such as this one
would violate the victim's rights, not vindicate them.
CONCLUSION
Justifying governmental institutions of blaming and punishing is a challeng-
ing endeavor because it involves tackling the difficult task of justifying the use of
state violence. I believe that we need to venture into the realm of political theory
in order to come to grips with these issues. Ascertaining whether the State can
justifiably punish offenders is not a definitional or sociological problem. The
question regarding the justification of punishment is a normative one and, as
such, it begs for a normative answer.
In light of the fact that the problem of justifying our practices of punishing
requires us to delve deep into the doctrines of political philosophy, it is surpris-
ing that scholars have mostly ignored studying the implications that Dworkin's
ideas might have for criminal law. In this Essay, I tried to contribute to filling
that gap by outlining what a dworkinian theory of punishment would look like.
Taking this theory seriously would lead us to call into question the legitimacy of
punishing people who commit victimless crimes or crimes to which the victim
has consented. Some might find these implications surprising and counterintui-
tive. I, on the other hand, find them normatively appealing.
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